pitcher otherwise would do, and is profoundly different from the inability-to-pour, say, of a hammer or a scythe.8
The next step, of course, is to interrogate the "pouring" of the pitcher, but at this crucial moment the rigor of the analysis seems to disappear. The pouring is seen to imply a four-fold polyvalence (Ge-viert), that itself is gathered into original Simplicity and One-ness.9 We shall examine the problem shortly. For the moment, it suffices to see: that the pouring gathers-together this pitcher-thing as thing; that the power of pouring to gather-together derives from a still more original gathering-power that springs from the polyvalent One; that ". . . this manifold [yet] simple gathering is what comes-to-presence in the pitcher. . . ." and as the pitcher, sc. is the Being of the pitcher, the "thing-ing of the thing";1 0 that (to return to the beginning), since near-ness comes to us only in that which is near, near-ness consists in nothing else than the Being of things: ". . . Near-ness in all its power draws near to us as the thing-ing of things."11
A. BEING
I. The Quadrate
When Heidegger speaks of the Being of things as essentially a gathering-process, we understand Being in the sense of Λόγος, which, of course, is to be understood as the original One. The puzzling part of the essay, however, lies in the fact that Heidegger sees in this One a four-fold polyvalence. What does he mean by Being as the Quadrate? The theme of our research is not Being but thought, so we do not feel obliged to solve the problem (if it can be solved). The purpose of our present remarks is simply to see it clearly as a problem.
8 VA, p. 170 (Nehmen, Einbehalten, Geschenk). We translate Geschenk as "pouring out," intending to suggest thereby the connotation of gift, effusion, bounty, etc. that Heidegger certainly means to imply.
9 VA, pp. i7o-r72, 176-177.
10 " . . . Dieses vielfältig einfache Versammeln ist das Wesende des Kruges.. (VA, p. 172). See VA, pp. 172,176 (Einfalt), 170,172,176 (versammelt), 172 (Verweilen des Gevierts), 176 (Dingen des Dinges).
11 " . . . Nähe waltet im Nähern als das Dingen des Dinges." (VA, p. 176). The author offers a short disquisition on the word "thing," examining the Old German (dine), Greek (ὄν), Roman (res), mediaeval (ens, Dine), modern (Gegenstand) meanings (VA, pp. 172-175).