This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate characterisation of There-being, sc. of the essence of man [as] thought in terms of the truth of Being as such (cf. Being and Time § 66). Accordingly, the first draft of the lecture course for the winter semester of 1937-38, which tries to analyse the necessity of the question of truth in the perspective of the question of Being, reads in part:

Over and over again we must insist: In the question of truth as posed here, what is at stake is not only an alteration in the traditional conception of truth, nor a complement of its current (re)presentation; what is at stake is a transformation in man's Being itself. This transformation is not demanded by new psychological or biological insights. Man here is not the object of any anthropology whatever. Man comes into question here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective : man in his relation to Being - sc. in the reversal: Beon and its truth in relation to man.

The "coming-to-pass" of the reversal which you ask about "is" Beon as such. It can only be thought out of the reversal. There is no special kind of coming-to-pass that is proper to this [process]. Rather, the reversal between Being and Time, between Time and Being, is determined by the way Being is granted, Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this "is granted" in the lecture "Time and Being" which you heard yourself here [in Freiburg] on January 30, 1962.10

If instead of "Time" we substitute: the lighting-up of the self-concealing [that is proper to] the process of coming-topresence, then Being is determined by the scope- of Time. This comes about, however, only insofar as the lighting-process of self-concealment assumes unto its want a thought that corresponds to it.

[The process of] presenc-ing (Being) is inherent in the lighting-up of self-concealment (Time). [The] lighting-up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being).

It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing reposes in a [mutual] ap-propriation and is called e-vent

10 [Translator's note. Awkward though it appears, this translation of Es gibt offers distinct advantages over the more natural "there is," for reasons that appear in the lecture to which Professor Heidegger alludes.]

William J. Richardson - Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought