(cf. Identity and Difference, p. 30 ff.).11 The fact that what we thoughtlessly enough call "truth" the Greeks called Ἀ-Λήθεια — well, indeed, in poetical and non-philosophical as in philosophical language — is not [a result of] their [own] invention and caprice. It is the richest endowment of their language, in which that-which-comes-to-presence as such attained non-concealment and — concealment. Without an eye for the granting of such a gift to man, without a sense for the e-mitting of such an e-mittence, one will no more comprehend what is said about the mittence of Being than the man born blind can ever experience what light and color are.12

The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II.

Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding. In proportion to the intrinsically manifold matter of Being and Time, all words which give it utterance (like reversal, forgottenness and mittence) are always ambiguous. Only a [commensurately] manifold thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this matter in a way that cor-responds with it.

This manifold thought requires, however, not a new language but a transformed relationship to the essenc[-ing] of the old one.

My wish for your work — for which you alone bear the responsibility — is this: may it help set in motion the manifold thinking of the simple business of thought, which, by reason of its very simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude.

Freiburg im Breisgau, early April, 1962


11 [Translator's note. For the translation of Ereignis by "e-vent," see below, p. 614, note 50.]

12 [Translator's note. For the translation of Erblicken by "have an eye for," see below, pp. 613-614. For Schicken and Seinsgeschick as "e-mitting" and "mittence," see below, p. 435.]