that the distinction formulates the jointure of every being.
Here the decisive question is raised: How is every being as such joined in this way? Where is the distinction of ground and existence rooted ?
On what path do we meet the root of the distinction? By a simple reflection. If every being insofar as it is a being is determined by the distinction named, the distinction must be rooted in beings as such, that is, in their Being.
Thus, the next question which arises is the one: how does Schelling determine the essence of Being? Granted that we correctly acknowledge the treatise on freedom as the acme of the metaphysics of German Idealism, we may also suspect that Schelling speaks of the essence of the Being of all beings in this treatise and thus answers the Aristotelian question: τί τὸ ὄν?
We find in the introduction to the treatise a passage which in the manner of its formulation and delimitation unequivocally claims to be a statement on the essence of beings as such. After an important discussion, these sentences follow, explicitly set apart by a dash (p. 24): "In the final and highest instance there is no other Being than will. Will is primordial Being and all predicates apply to it alone-groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only to find this highest expression." (Being as will.) Our task is (1.) to elucidate this essential determination of Being, (2.) to show how this distinction is rooted in Being thus determined.
Regarding (1): if we begin the elucidation of the passage with the last sentence, we immediately see that it is only the abbreviated and final version of Aristotle's statement: "καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, . . . (Metaphysics Z, 1028 b 2-4).
Ultimacy consists in the fact that the ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον is lacking. It must be lacking, for the beginning of the passage declares the essence of beings as such to be found and determined in the highest degree. However, this is not a private conviction of Schelling's. Rather, the claim to this knowledge distinguishes German Idealism as the unconditioned Idealism of the Spirit.
"Will is primordial Being, " that is, will corresponds to the primordial essence of Being. Why? Because the predicates which state the essence of Being are attributed to will in the eminent sense. It alone is completely sufficient for the predicates named. ("Being?" Beings conceived ab-solutely, at the same time the being as such.)
a.) What are the essential predicates o f Being? Groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation .
"Groundlessness." We stop short. Did we not hear that to every being as such a "ground" belongs? Certainly. Thus the groundlike does belong to Being, to be sure. But that does not mean that Being means needing a ground. Being is intrinsically groundlike, what gives ground, presences as the ground, has the character of ground. Precisely because it is groundlike, groundgiving, it cannot need a ground. The groundlike is groundless , what grounds, what presences as