In order to understand simple origination, post-metaphysical thinking cannot dispense with pre-metaphysical Logos, with "Logos in the sense of the gathering that preserves originarily";48 but neither can it dispense with the epochal temporality discovered through metaphysics. The simple event that is origination can be attained only through the many complex junctures that have initiated new economies throughout the ages. This unavoidable detour through history will be fully understandable only when the difference between what I will call the original and the originary has been established. This difference will be developed below.
To conclude this survey of the vocabulary and to see what issues it raises, it should be clear that the historical-epochal notion of 'beginning' (Beginn), with its overdetermination of event, and the experimental-destinal notion of 'inception' (Anfang), with its ontological overdetermination, are fully intelligible only in conjunction with the notion of 'origination' (Ursprung) as the event proper, itself historically overdetermined. The natural locus of 'beginning' is epochal history; that of 'inception' is thinking; and that of 'origination' is the event of appropriation. The question is not: Which is more fundamental, history, thinking, or being? but rather: How is origination identical with both inception and beginning, yet nevertheless different from both? "Originarily, as well as beginningly," poetry and thinking are the same, said the text cited in the epigraph to this section. On the other hand, "initially being makes itself known as logos and thereby discloses itself as what is to be thought originarily."49 If it is possible to see how, for Heidegger, the origin is linked to history, it will also be possible to overcome (while retaining it) the opposition between diachrony and synchrony—or between left-wing Heideggerians, who read in him only deconstruction, and right-wing Heideggerians, who read in him only the Poem of Being. The project Heidegger pursues after his Kehre crystallizes in the question, How does presencing become history? How does it, as event, condition all that can occur?
The event to which the Heideggerian notion of origination points is always a showing-forth. Its most familiar instances are the "rising up" of speech and of an artwork. "To make something rise up with a leap, to bring it into being from provenance in an enabling leap: that is what the word origination means."50 This description suggests perfectly the event-like character of origination, but it reveals neither its anti-humanist impact nor its connection with history, nor in which (non-dialectical) sense the origin is both one and many. To retrieve the full sense of Ursprung, a double route has to be followed: asking the question of ontology more originarily (section 18) in order to attain the one issue of radical phenomenology, being as time, and asking the question of origin ontologically (section 19) in order to attain the anti-humanist solution to that issue, presencing as 'event'. Ereignis and history will thus appear as the terms of the temporal difference.
31. N II 481/EPh 75.
32. GA 55 222.
33. GA 55 220. The editor of this volume, who formulated the section titles, put it more straightforwardly: "The Equation of Thinking and Logic as The Origin of Western Destiny" (GA 55 221, emphasis added).
34. GA 55 150.
35. GA 55 174.
36. GA 55 245.
37. GA 55 196.
38. GA 55 197.
39. EdD 17/PLT 9, cf. W. Marx, op. cit., p. 251.
40. GA 55 227.