conforming to presence as it comes about, to the event of presencing—but henceforth without the fiction of some ultimate stabilizing ground. In this way the technological reversal contains the opportunity to recognize and retain what is mos t ordinary in life, namely, that its context is never the same. Ever since Aristotle succeeded in solving the more ancient aporias about motion, becoming and change, kinesis (except in astral theology) has stood opposed to being. Read in terms of the question ti to on the fact of the technological turning appears to be charged with a potential that shows how Heidegger works not only through, but also against metaphysics: leading the attributive modes of presencing-in which presence is primarily the attribute of God, nature , or consciousness-to their fulfillment, that turning opens up the possibility of a withering away of these modes . Such a decline would break the Aristotelian opposition between being and becoming and would allow action to conform , not to any principial regularities, but rather to each thing's arrival in presence , each event of presencing, as such.
This gives additional evidence that to speak of being inevitably also includes speaking not only of becoming, but furthermore of doing or acting. Action (in the strict sense of intervention in public life) , just as much as thinking (in the strict sense of life of the mind), must become docile to the event of presencing—which, since the kenosis of ideals in the Wes tern world, it has already begun doing. The question of action, and more precisely of political intervention, enters this phenomenology from an entirely different angle than in any formal derivation-in which the middle term is 'goal' (telos)—of the schemes of πρᾶξις from the schemes of θεωρία. Heidegger does not hold that either thinking or acting is intrinsically telic. That is why practical doctrines cannot follow in any way from ontological ones: the argument of derivation has lost its middle term. As stated earlier, instead of an argumentative priority, he seeks a practical one. The ensuing inversion of the transcendental status of action permits him to suggest that public praxis in an economy deprived of any epochal principle can only be anarchic. The hinge on which this inversion turns again concerns the representation of goal: it is necessary to exist 'without why' in order to understand presencing as itself without arche or telos, 'without why' .
Praxis deprived of a goal or end is the concrete condition for thinking 'being itself as deprived of an end. Although he renders the derivation 'acting follows being' non-operational, Heidegger is more explicit about the impossibility of deriving any philosophic disciplines from the thinking of being than he is about the practical abolition of teleology as the condition of that thinking of being. Anarchic praxis: this is the topos where the man Martin Heidegger undoubtedly would not so much have liked to see himself led.
3. 'Acting without a why': you will not escape the accusation of advocating the abolition of all practical norms . Your reverse reading of Heidegger's texts leads you to oppose a relativism without remedy to those who