delivered over to the world. Cura thus has the sense in which aheadness and thrownness unite to form the moment of throw projection.
8. This prior engagement is what makes us able to care. Seneca is speaking about cura in ontic terms (we would say: ex-sistentiel terms). Our own ontological-ex-sistential interpretation of cura is not a theoretical generalization of the ontic sense of cura. That is, we are not saying that human relations are personally invested in caring and worrying about things. The only “generalizing” here is of an a priori and ex-sistential nature. We are not talking about psychological care or concern. We are speaking ontologically about the very structure of ex-sistence as given over to, occupied with, dedicated to making sense of things. That is what makes us able to have psychological cares and concerns about things, and that is the basis of our interpretation of cura as ex-sistence’s a priori engagement in making sense of things.
9. It is transcendentally universal. This a priori structure has a “transcendental universality” that underlies all ontic understandings of ex-sistence, not just those that deal with the “cares and concerns” of life.
10. Its ontological richness. Ex-sistential structures may seem “empty” and “general” when compared with concrete ontic-ex-sistentiel qualities. However, those ex-sistential structures have their own ontological richness and complexity, which is already evident in our bivalent structure: thrown ahead in the meaning-giving world and thus making sense of things.
11. Summary and transition. We have interpreted cura in Hyginus’ fable as a pre-ontological expression of the ex-sistential fact that ex-sistence is a priori given over to and engaged in making sense of things. But as we have often insisted, our goal is not a philosophical anthropology but a fundamental ontology about how “is” and “being” are understood. That specific and delimited focus determines the kinds of experiences we have chosen to discuss.
At this point we need to pull together explicitly what has been gained thus far, not by just reviewing and summarizing SZ I.1 but rather by examining more closely two important issues that we have already alluded to: the question of “realness” and the question of “truth.”