II
In dealing with the science of history, it may seem that this path from the goal of the science to the function of its concept of time and from there to the structure of this concept of time is a detour. We can reach our goal much easier and quicker in the science of history if we remember that there exists in the methodology of the science of history a special auxiliary discipline that deals specifically with determining time in the science of history: historical chronology. Here the peculiar character of the historical concept of time would immediately come to light. Why this course is not being taken can be explained only at the end of our analysis. We will then also be in a position to understand the only essential moment in chronology that is of relevance for the historical concept of time. We will thus follow the path already mapped out and first attempt to find out something about the goal of the science of history.
Here we are immediately confronted with a difficulty insofar as complete agreement among historians about the goal and object of the science of history has not been reached. Thus whatever we determine here about this problem cannot claim to be conclusive and complete. However, this fact cannot put our actual problem in jeopardy if we are identifying only those moments in the concept of the science of history that will allow us to understand the function of the concept of time in it.
The object of the science of history is human beings—not as biological objects but rather to the extent that their achievements in the realms of mind and body actualize the idea of culture. This creation of culture in its fullness and multiformity runs its course temporally, undergoes development, is subject to the most diverse transformations and reorganizations, takes hold of what is in the past in order to work with it further or combat it. The creation of culture by human beings within and in unison with the associations and organizations (the state) created by them is basically the objectificationb of the human spirit. This objectification of spirit that actualizes itself in the course of time is of interest to the historian not in its entirety at each particular time, as though the historian wanted in each case to record everything that in any sense happened at the time. It has been said that it is only what is historically effective that interests the historian. Eduard Meyer, who has given this qualification, elaborates on it and correctly explains it as follows: “The selection depends on the historical interest the present has in some effect, in the result of a development.”8
An interest is, however, always determined on the basis of a point of view, guided by a norm. The selection of the historical from the fullness of what is given is thus based on a relation to values. Accordingly, the goal of the science of history is to depict the context of the effects and development of the objectifications of human life in the singularity and uniqueness of these objectifications, which are able to be understood through a relation to cultural values. But one essential characteristic of every historical object still has not been touched on.