dealings are transformed into a mere looking around without any view to directing oneself to routine tasks and gearing things in certain directions. Such looking around takes on the character of merely looking at. . . . In the care of this looking, i.e., in curiosity (cura [care], curiositas [curiosity]), the world is there for one not as the with-which of dealings directed to routine tasks but solely from the point of view of its look, its appearance. The looking becomes more fully actualized when one proceeds to define the world looked at and as such can organize itself into the form of science. Thus science is a mode of dealings with the world temporalized and unfolded by factical life itself and concerned with looking at the world. As the movement of going about these dealings, science is a mode of the being of factical life and plays a part in shaping its Dasein. The inventory of ways of looking at the world, i.e., points of view, obtained at any particular time (i.e., the definition of contexts of objects in the world with regard to how they look) is something that has accrued to the circumspection out of which it has grown. Here looking around actualizes itself in the mode of addressing and discussing the objects it deals with. The world is always being encountered in a particular manner of having-been-addressed, i.e., of an address that has made certain claims about it (λόγος).
In releasing itself from its tendencies to direct itself to its routine tasks and perform them, going about dealings takes a break and makes a sojourn. Looking at the world becomes an autonomous form of dealings with it. As such, this looking becomes, in holding itself back from its work, a sojourning among objects for the sake of defining them. Objects are originally there for one as objects having significance, whereas objects in the sense of mere things and facts first emerge from the world as it is factically encountered (i.e., out of what has significance) within a multistage process of theorizing directed to the world in a particular manner.
Factical life moves at any time within a certain state of having-been-interpreted that has been handed down to it, and it has reworked or worked out anew. Circumspection makes the world available to life as having been interpreted on the basis of those points of view within which it is encountered and awaited as an object of anxious concern, arranged in the forms of tasks, and sought as a refuge to which one can flee. These points of view, which are for the most part available in an inexplicit manner and which factical life has more often than not simply slipped into through habit as opposed to having explicitly appropriated them, sketch out in advance the paths on which the movement of caring can actualize itself. The interpretation of the world is factically also the interpretation that life itself stands in. In it is also laid down the directions in which life takes itself up into its care. In other words, what is also established in it is the particular sense the Dasein of life has, i.e., the “as-what” and the “how” in which human beings maintain themselves within their own forehaving.
The movement of care is not a process running its course on its own over and against the world that is there for it. The world is there in life and for life. However, it is not there in the sense of a mere being-thought-about and being-