MORTALS
something into its essence in advance, when we properly shelter something back into its essence, it corresponds to the word ‘to free’ [freien]: to shelter in peace [einfrieden]” (GA 7: 151/PLT 147, tm {1971 PLT 149}). To protect is to let something essence in a space of freedom. It is to create that guarded space of freedom for what essences. Dwelling creates the conditions for things to appear at peace: “Dwelling, being brought to peace [zum Frieden, the space of Freedom], means: remaining at peace in the free-space [einge friedet bleiben in das Frye], i.e. in the space of freedom [das Freie], which spares each thing in its essence” (GA 7: 151/PLT 147, tm). Sparing is thus an invitation to exposition. What is spared is allowed into a space of freedom (a breadth or expanse) where it exposes itself as radiant. “The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing” (GA 7: 151/PLT 147).
And yet this radiance cannot exist independently and alone. It must be “housed” somewhere. What is it that the mortals are called on to spare or protect? Heidegger asks, “how do mortals accomplish dwelling as this sparing? Mortals would never be able to do this, if dwelling were only a residence upon the earth, under the sky, before the divinities, and with the mortals. Dwelling is far rather always already a residence with the things. Dwelling as sparing preserves [verwahrt] the fourfold in that with which the mortals reside: in the things” (GA 7: 153/PLT 149, tm, em). Dwelling is the taking up of a residence among things. Thus it is only possible as a “building” (bauen), a maintenance and construction of things. To protect radiance is to dwell amidst things.
Heidegger terms this comportment towards things “releasement” (Gelassenheit), in the 1955 lecture of that name. This releasement is a twofold bearing, both a “releasement toward things” and an “openness for the secret” (GA 16: 527/DT 54; GA 16: 528/DT 55, tm). In the essay, releasement is construed as a counterforce to the prevailing technological domination. Part of this domination lies in our bondage to technological objects. Heidegger proposes “saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ simultaneously” to these objects (GA 16: 527/DT 54, tm). In so doing, we do not entirely refuse technology (say “no” to it), something that would be impossible to accomplish anyway (even the forester is positioned by the cellulose industry, we should recall), but we do not entirely accept technology as it is either (say “yes” to it). Nor do we accept some devices and not others or say yes to all technology but only up to a certain point. Instead, saying both yes and no means seeing what is non-present in technology. Heidegger explains this as “we allow the technological objects into our daily world and at the same time leave them outside, that is, resting on their own as things, things that are nothing absolute, but rather remain referred to something higher than themselves” (GA 16: 527/DT 54, tm). The ambiguous relation to technological objects is itself a recognition of