Translated by Pete Ferreira
14
As to the manner in which this division operates, it starts with the common concept by dividing it in two basic ways, the being of substance (οὐσία) and the being of accident (συμβεβηκός). The first way, that of the substance, does not let itself be split further (although it is possible to distinguish different types of substance). The second, that of the accident, is analogical and can be divided into two classes, depending on whether they belong to the substance absolutely or only in relation to others: you have the absolute class of the accidents or feelings (παθε) and class relationships (πρός τι). Finally, absolute accidents can be divided, depending on their relationship to substance, in three ways: absolute accidents inherent in the substance as ένυπαρχοντα (i.e. the πόσον and ποίον); absolute accidents are πρός τῷ ὑποκείμενοι and not ἐν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, and in general are κινήσεις (ποιεῖν and πάσχειν); finally the accidents with the absolute character of τα ἐν τινι (the που and ποτε). Brentano so derives the full table of categories (whose number is eight and not ten): οὐσία, πόσον, ποίον, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν, που, ποτε, πρός τι.
This solution, which aims to capture the unitary structure of being and its foundation, reveals obvious scholastic influences. They emerge mainly in the tendency to conceive of being – Brentano sticking with the Aristotle's firm ban on considering it a genus – as the common element starting from which the categories can be deduced by division. Moreover, in the attempt at a systematic deduction of the categories Brentano refers explicitly not only to Thomas (chap. V, § 14), in whose conception of being – as has been shown12 – are found influences of Neoplatonic origin – but also commentators with Neoplatonic orientation like Ammonius, Pseudo-Augustine and Isidore of Seville (chap. V, § 14).
It is probably this aspect of the Brentanist treatment of the problem of being in Aristotle that best thematically outlines Heidegger's philosophical formation. This influence reinforces the hypothesis that, even if the engagement with Aristotelian ontology that Brentano's reading requires is the source of Heidegger's thoughts on being, that engagement is driven by the desire, already present in Brentano, to grasp the unity of being, that is, to bring the multiplicity of its meanings to a unitary basis.
12 Cfr. K. Kremer, Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin, Brill, Leiden 1966; E. Berti, Aristotelismo e neoplatonismo nella dottrina tomistica di Dio come “ipsum esse”, in Id., Studi aristotelici, Japadre, L’Aquila 1975, pp. 347-351.