Translated by Pete Ferreira
15
This basic need remains essentially present in the latter evolution of Heideggerian speculation. Even later, when Heidegger will tackle the problem of being in Aristotle independently of the Brentanist interpretation, his thoughts will remain firmly tied to the thread represented by the search for the fundamental unified sense of being. In particular, if you follow the route taken by Heidegger in dealing with this matter in the twenties and early thirties, one can see that in this period he tries alternately each of the four fundamental meanings in relation to its ability to act as a unitary basis of the others. And one can see how Heidegger quickly abandons the idea that this basic meaning is that of substance, that is, of being in the sense of the categories, as Brentano argued. He matures convinced that this meaning is that of being as true, and because of this belief he strives to show how already in Aristotle there is present an ontological understanding of the phenomenon of the truth (which in his thinking is then resumed and radicalized in the equation to being and aletheia). Finally, probably starting in the early 1930s (as can be seen on the basis of the course of summer semester 1931, dedicated to an interpretation of the first three chapters of the 9th book of Metaphysics), being in the sense of true is followed as the fundamental meaning being in the sense of ἐνέργεια, since in it Heidegger sees the reverberation of the original understanding of being as Φύσις (which after the "Turn", as is known, is the dimension that Heidegger want to thematize as preceding and different with respect to metaphysics).
Returning now to his early training, it is possible to reconstruct the meaning of another juvenile reading that Heidegger himself specifically mentions along with the dissertation of Brentano, namely reading the treatise Vom Sein. Abriß der Ontologie by Carl Braig.