Translated by Pete Ferreira
38
With the discovery and the determination of the theme of his thinking, namely the connection of being and time, Heidegger is placed in a position to critically call to account the great foundational events of ontology and successively distance himself from them. In particular, regarding Aristotle, the positive appropriation found in examining the question of truth crosses over progressively to an attitude of critical distancing. Decisive in this sense is the irruption in Heidegger thinking of the figure of Kant. During winter semester 1925/26, interrupting the interpretation of Aristotle and changing the advertised program of lectures, Heidegger goes to work entirely on Kant, in whom he believes he can see "the only philosopher who even suspected that the understanding of being and its characteristics is connected with time." 27
However, despite this distancing from Aristotle, the comparison with his thoughts in the Marburg courses proves crucial on at least two other problems, which we must examine, namely the problem of 'subject' and the problem of temporality.
As was the case with the question of truth, so it is also regarding to the question of the 'subject', i.e. in relation to the determination of the fundamental mode of being of conscious life, the nature of man, of being-there, Heidegger turns to Aristotle to find in him the solution to these problems that Husserlian phenomenology left open.
Indeed, in Heidegger's eyes the account that Husserl gave, of human subjectivity in terms of consciousness and the I, remained trapped in a fundamental aporia, namely in the aporia of the I belonging to the world and the simultaneous constitution of the world by work of the I. The solution proposed by Husserl, for which it was necessary to distinguish between the psychological I that belongs to the world and the transcendental I which constitutes it, that is, between the being-real of the first and the being-ideal of second, was not considered satisfactory by Heidegger.
27 GA 21, p. 194. [Logic: The Question of Truth, 163.]