Translated by Pete Ferreira
60
What interests us here and must be taken into consideration is the detailed interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of time that Heidegger carries out in the first step of this program, which is in the context of the analysis of the common understanding of time and temporality. Heidegger's intent is to move "forward through the common understanding of time toward temporality, in which the Dasein's ontological constitution is rooted and to which time as commonly understood belongs".63
Now, in the analysis of the common understanding of time, Heidegger focuses on the Aristotelian treatment, because, as he explicitly points out, the latter represents the first and most radical philosophical codification of the common experience of time, and on it depend almost all the major philosophical treatises of the phenomenon (Plotinus, Simplicius, Augustine, Suarez, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Bergson). As Heidegger himself asserts, "it can be said that subsequent times did not get essentially beyond the stage of Aristotle's treatment of the problem—apart from a few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the Aristotelian concept of time".64
So, at the beginning of the second part of summer semester 1927, Heidegger sticks to an interpretation of those five chapters of Physics (IV, 10, 217b 29-14, 224b 17), in which Aristotle reveals his conception of time.65 Since Heidegger first summarizes the content of each chapter of the Aristotelian text, taking care to focus on each aporia as it is presented, it is interesting to see first – based on these synopses – the problems that Heidegger believes important and discusses.
In the first chapter of Aristotle's discussion of time (Phys. IV, 10), the problem is set in two fundamental directions, on the one hand towards the understanding of the way of being of time, and on the other towards the determination of its essence, to which correspond two basic aporias: (a) the first is whether time belongs to the entity or to the non-entity (πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν ἢ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, 217 b 31), if it presents itself as such in itself, or if it appears instead as owned by another entity; (b) the second aporia concerns its nature (τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, 217b 32).
63 GA 24, 324. [The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 229]
65 Ibid., 327-361 (§ 19). [Ibid, 231-256.] On the problem of time in Aristotle see P. F. Conen, Die Zeittheorie des Aristoteles, Beck, München 1964; J. Moreau, L'espace et le temps selon Aristote, Antenor, Padova 1965; L. Ruggiu, Tempo coscienza e essere nella filosofia di Aristotele, Paideia, Brescia 1970; J. Hintikka, Time and Necessity, O.U.P., Oxford 1973; V. Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote. Commentaire sur le Quatrième livre de la "Physique" (10-14) et sur la "Poétique", Vrin, Paris 1982; R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and Continuum, Duckworth, London 1983.