Franco Volpi - Heidegger and Aristotle

Translated by Pete Ferreira


76


The essential features of the 'existential' understanding of time that results, are: "1) The essence of time has an ecstatic character. 2) Together with this ecstatic structure there is a horizonal character which belongs to time. 3) Time neither passes nor remains but it temporalizes itself. Temporalization is the primal phenomenon of "motion". 4) Time is not relative to sensibility but is more primordial than sensibility and than mind and reason (...). 5) Methodologically we should note that, because it constitutes the metaphysical continuity of Dasein, time is not intelligible if Dasein is construed in some sort of theoretical scheme, whether it be as a psychical whole, as cognitive-volitional subject, as self-awareness, or as the unity of body, soul, and mind. Moreover, the analysis of Dasein must select for its guiding horizon the horizon which, in factic existence, continually guides Dasein's being-toward-itself in its being-with with others and in its relation to beings unlike Dasein prior to, outside of, and despite all theory."76

This enumeration of the salient features of the Heideggerian understanding of time, particularly the conclusion it anticipates, sufficiently shows how the determination of originary temporality engages deeply in the practical determination of the mode of being of being-there previously stated. Thus, the interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of time, which leads towards individualization of temporality as ontological structure of being-there, connects closely with the discussion of the problem of truth and the problem of the 'subject', showing how the critical confrontation with Aristotle, conducted by Heidegger in the Marburg courses and in Being and Time, embraces in all its breadth all three fundamental issues that occupy the Heidegger's thought at this stage in his evolution. In fact, the interpretation of Aristotle on questions of truth, the 'subject' and temporality animates the Heidegger's project in a radical reinterpretation of the fundamental structure of human life in terms of being-there, and through this new understanding it will be possible for Heidegger, distancing himself from the tradition, to reach the radically secure foundation on which to rest his metaphysics of finitude.


76 GA 26, 256. [The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 198.]

A page from Franco Volpi's Heidegger and Aristotle