they correspond to the unconcealed and its unconcealedness. Here we receive an intimation of how χρή, which governs the conjunction of λέγειν and νοεῖν, is expressed through Ἀλήθεια. To make us see this more clearly would require a translation of the entire opening section of what is usually called Parmenides' Didactic Poem. But first we must give thought to something else; something that leads up to what bas been intimated, and what, without being specifically discussed, illumines the matter indicated at the end of our lectures.

The conjunction of λέγειν and νοεῖν, however, is such that it does not rest upon itself. Letting-lie-before-us and taking-to-heart in themselves point toward something that touches and only thereby fully defines them. Therefore, the essential nature of thinking cannot be adequately defined either by λέγειν, taken alone, or by νοεῖν, taken alone, or again by both together taken as a conjunction.

Later on, that course is taken nonetheless. Thinking becomes the λέγειν of the ).~ :in the sense of proposition. At the same time, thinking becomes the νοεῖν in the sense of apprehension by reason. The two definitions are coupled together, and so determine what is henceforth called thinking in the Western-European tradition.

The coupling of λέγειν and νοεῖν, as proposition and as reason, are distilled into what the Romans call ratio. Thinking appears as what is rational. Ratio comes from the verb reor. Reor means to take something for something—νοεῖν; and this is at the same time to state something as something—λέγειν. Ratio becomes reason. Reason is the subject matter of logic. Kant's main work, the Critique of Pure Reason, deals with the critique of pure reason by way of logic and dialectic.

But the original nature of λέγειν and νοεῖν, disappears in ratio. As ratio assumes dominion, all relations are turned around. For medieval and modern philosophy now explain