ZOLLIKON SEMINARS, 1959-1969
way of Da-sein*s being. But what kind of being? If the body as body is always my body, then this is my own way of being. Thus, bodying forth is co-determined by my being human in the sense of the ecstatic sojourn amidst the beings in the clearing [gelichtet]. The limit of bodying forth (the body is only as it is bodying forth: "body") is the horizon of being within which I sojourn [aufhalten].* Therefore, the limit of my bodying forth changes constantly through the change in the reach of my sojourn. In contrast, the limit of the corporeal thing usually does not change. If it does, it does so at most only by growing bigger or growing thinner. But leanness is not merely a phenomenon of corporeality, but of the body as well. The lean body can, of course, be measured again as a corporeal thing regarding its weight. The volume of the corporeal thing (body has no "volume") has diminished.
Everything that has been stated about the limits of a body and of a corporeal thing is still insufficiently specified, and must be raised explicitly once more.
For the time being, we note only that the "mine** in this talk about "my body** relates to myself. The bodying forth has this peculiar relationship to p. 114 the self. Kant once said that man distinguishes himself from animals by the fact that he can say "I"!2 This assertion can be formulated still more radically. The human being distinguishes himself from animals because he can "say** anything at all, that is to say, because he has a language. Are saying and language the same? Is every saying a speaking? No. For instance, if you assert: "This watch lies here," what is involved in this assertion? Why doesn't an animal speak? Because it has nothing to say. In what way does it have nothing to say? Human speaking is saying. Not every saying is speaking, yet every speaking is saying, even speaking that "says nothing." Speaking always makes sounds. In contrast, I can say something to myself silently without making a sound.
Therefore, I can assert that die watch is on the table. Thus, what I say by this assertion refers to a certain state of affairs. Saying makes something visible as a matter of fact. According to its ancient etymological meaning, to "say" is to "show," to let be seen. How is this possible? When I asserted something about the watch, you all agreed with it. You could only do
* We translate both Aufenhalt and sich aufhalten as "sojourn" rather than as "dwelling/to dwell," as in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time, since the verb wohnen is usually translated as "to dwell" in Heidegger's later writings. See Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 320 ff. "Sojourn" means to stay for a short time as a guest and then to reside (Old French: sojuner; from Latin: subdiurnare, diurnum-dies, day; "journey" is a day's march; "journeyman" is a worker by the day; "journal" is a daily record).-TRANSLATORS