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ZOLLIKON SEMINARS
Wiener's definition of the human being is as follows: "Man [is] an information [device]."3 Wiener goes on regarding the human being: "Nevertheless, one characteristic distinguishes man from other animals in a way which leaves no doubt: Man is an animal that speaks.... It also will not do to say that man is an ensouled animal. For, unfortunately, the existence of the soul—whatever one may take it to be—is not accessible to scientific methods of inquiry" (p. 14). As an animal who speaks, the human being must be represented in such a way that language can be explained scientifically as something computable, that is, as something that can be controlled.
You see the same thing here, we already encountered in the statement by Professor Hegglin: What the human being is, is determined by the method sanctioned by natural science. In cybernetics, language must be conceived in a manner that can be approached scientifically. In the basic determination of what the human being is, the foundation of cybernetics seemingly agrees with the ancient tradition of the metaphysical definition of man. The Greek determined the human being as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, that is, as a living being possessing language. Wiener states: Man is that animal that speaks. If man is explained scientifically, then what distinguishes him from the animal—namely, language—must be represented so that it can be explained according to scientific principles. In short, language as language must be represented as something that can be measured. A more thorough interpretation of the nature of cybernetics will have to wait for later discussion. We must also postpone the question posed last time, that is, where does the measurability of something belong, whether to the thing itself, or not. This question is to be posed again within the context of a discussion on cybernetics.
July 6 and 8, 1965, at Boss's Home
I. July 6, 1965
When I arrived, Dr. Boss gave me a bagful of questions concerning our previous seminar. It contains sixteen questions in no apparent order. But one can easily see that we are dealing with two sets of questions [here]. One refers to the characterization and highlighting of the phenomenon of the body; the other contains questions pertaining to the determination of psychosomatics as a science, that is, questions concerning the distinction between psyche and soma, at the same time concerning the relationship of each to the other. It is evident that both sets of questions belong