and speaking, and thus language in general, are also always phenomena of the body.* Hearing is a being-with-the-theme in a bodily way. To hear something in itself involves the relation of bodying forth to what is heard. Bodying forth [Leiben] always belongs to being-in-the-world. It always codetermines being-in-the-world, openness, and the having of a world.

Even when I merely think to myself silently and do not utter anything, such thinking is always a saying. Therefore, Plato is able to call thinking a dialogue of the soul with itself.

Even what has been heard and written about the theme plays a role in such a silent thinking and saying. Silent thinking occurs as an unthematic making-present of sounds and letters. Such making-present is therefore co-determined by bodying forth. For instance, one cannot daydream about a landscape without necessarily saying something to oneself insofar as saying is always a letting-be-shown of something, for instance a [letting-be-shown] of the landscape, which is the subject matter of the daydream. Such a letting-be-shown always occurs through language. Therefore, speaking in the sense of verbal articulation must always be strictly distinguished from saying, since the latter can also occur without verbal articulation. Someone who is mute and cannot speak might under certain circumstances have a great deal to say.

To be involved in something "body and soul" means: My body remains here, but the being-here of my body, my sitting on the chair here, is essentially always already a being-there at something. My being-here, for instance, means: to see and hear you there.

A second question concerns Professor Hegglins's distinction between the somatic and the psychical regarding the measurability or nonmeasurability of both realms. The question is the following: Is any [other] distinction at all possible for the natural sciences, given the fundamental dogma that nature be understood as determined by its universal measurability?

But then, the distinction between the somatic and the psychical is not an act of stating something within natural science, that is, it does not involve a measuring of both realms. Therefore, when Professor Hegglin draws his distinction, he is necessarily delving into philosophy and taking a step beyond his science. For the natural scientific [way of] thinking there is no other distinction. Not only this, but it cannot make any distinction whatsoever referring to the difference between the two realms of beings [the immeasurable and the measurable]. Distinctions in natural

* By referring explicitly to the "phenomenon of the body" [Leibphänomen], Heidegger goes beyond what he said about the different modalities of "hearing" in Being and Time, sec. 34. See also Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, pp. 265-68.-TRANSLATORS