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speak of ἕν. All distinctions fall away in the god. Thereby, not only a sublimity of the god vis-a-vis the other living beings is expressed, but that which Heraclitus says about the god must be thought from the peculiar analogous relationship of the god to ἕν τὸ σοφὸν.
In Fr. 32, Heraclitus says the following: ἕν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα. "The one, which alone is wise, is not willing and yet willing to be called by the name Zeus." In a certain manner we could think ἕν in Zeus, if the surrounding ἕν of the whole is also represented by Zeus as the highest innerworldly being. It is important, therefore, that Heraclitus says οὐκ ἐθέλει [is not willing] first and then ἐθέλει [is willing]. Only after the negation can a certain analogical correspondence be said of the god and ἕν.
PARTICIPANT: In order to carry out your interpretation of ἕν, one must understand ἕν in a two-fold meaning. On one hand, ἕν is in opposition to tel πάντα, and on the other, ἕν is as the unity of opposites of ἕν and πάντα. One cannot posit the opposition between ἕν and πάντα without presupposing a bridging unity between them. Perhaps I can clarify myself by a reference to Schelling. Schelling says that the absolute is not only the unity, but the unity of unity and of opposition. Thereby it is meant that behind each opposition stands a bridging unity. If we wish to avoid a two-world doctrine, then ἕν stands not only in opposition to tel πάντα, but we must think ἕν at the same time as bridging unity.
FINK: ἕν is the unity within which there first is the entirety of πάντα in their manifold oppositions. You argue formally with the scheme of concepts from German idealism, that the absolute is the identity of identity and nonidentity. This relationship can be developed in other fashions. Thereby, we do not, however, come into the dimension of Heraclitus. ἕν and πάντα form a unique distinction. It is better if we speak here of distinction and not of opposition. Otherwise, we think all too easily of the usual oppositions like warm-cold, male-female, and so on, and thus of reversible and irreversible oppositions. One could project here an entire logic of oppositions. Our question is directed toward ἕν. We came onto its trace in departure from lightning. In the view of natural science, lightning is nothing other than a specific electrical appearance. But Heraclitus thinks the nonphenomenal rising of the entirety of πάντα in it. Although we have uncovered more nuances of the ἕν-πάντα relatedness in going through various fragments, we still cannot comprehend this relatedness completely. After we have learned about the ἕν in the form of lightning, lightning bolt, sun, and seasons, we also met with the determination of ἕν as fire. Since we did not want to comprehend πυρός τροπαί in a blunt physiological sense, we had to search for another comprehension.
In Fr. 76, we learned for the first time the formula, "to live the death of something." In Fr. 62">, we found the formula again as the relationship of immortals to mortals. We attempted with this formula of counter